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CELL PHONES, POLICE RECORDING, AND
THE INTERSECTION OF THE FIRST AND
FOURTH AMENDMENTS
CONOR M. REARDON†
ABSTRACT
In a recent spate of highly publicized incidents, citizens have used
cell phones equipped with video cameras to record violent arrests.
Oftentimes they post their recordings on the Internet for public
examination. As the courts have recognized, this behavior lies close to
the heart of the First Amendment.
But the Constitution imperfectly protects this new form of
government monitoring. Fourth Amendment doctrine generally
permits the warrantless seizure of cell phones used to record violent
arrests, on the theory that the recording contains evidence of a crime.
The Fourth Amendment inquiry does not evaluate a seizing officer’s
state of mind, permitting an official to seize a video for the very
purpose of suppressing its contents. Moreover, Supreme Court
precedent is typically read to ignore First Amendment interests
implicated by searches and seizures.
This result is perverse. Courts evaluating these seizures should stop
to recall the Fourth Amendment’s origins as a procedural safeguard
for expressive interests. They should remember, too, the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence surrounding seizures of obscene materials—an
area in which the Court carefully shaped Fourth Amendment doctrine
to protect First Amendment values. Otherwise reasonable seizures can
become unreasonable when they threaten free expression, and
seizures of cell phones used to record violent arrests are of that stripe.
Courts should therefore disallow this breed of seizure, trusting the
political branches to craft a substitute procedure that will protect law-
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enforcement interests without doing violence to First Amendment
freedoms.

INTRODUCTION
When Jennifer Gondola left New Haven’s Pulse Nightclub on a
Saturday night in June of 2012, the arrest was already in progress. The
suspect, a young man, kicked and thrashed on the ground. Officers
1
struggled to handcuff him. A crowd gathered and shouted. Gondola,
along with several others in the bunch, produced her cell phone and
2
began to film.
3
The video, posted on the Internet the next week, paints a grainy
portrait of a messy encounter between citizens and police. The crowd
4
voices support for the suspect as the tussle continues. Finally, an
officer forces the man facedown onto the pavement and handcuffs
him. Sergeant Chris Rubino, shouting and pointing, puts his foot on
the prone suspect’s head.
“Stop resisting!” shouts Rubino.
“Put that shit on YouTube!” someone yells.
“Why does he have his foot on his head? That’s crazy, yo,” says
5
Gondola.
The encounter between the suspect and the police eventually
began to calm, but the controversy surrounding the event escalated.
6
An officer spotted Gondola filming. Rubino approached her and
demanded that she stop. She refused on the ground that it was her
7
“civil right” to record what was happening.
8
“Well, I have a right to review it,” Rubino allegedly replied.
Gondola promptly placed the phone in her bra; Rubino handcuffed
9
her and instructed a female officer to remove it. The officer did, and

1. Paul Bass, Sgt. Arrests Video-Taker; IA Probe Begins, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (June 4,
2012, 5:17 PM), http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/sgt._probed_
after_arresting_video-taker.
2. Id.
3. Seized Video of New Haven Arrest Released, WTNH NEWS 8 (July 3, 2012, 3:01 PM),
http://www.wtnh.com/dpp/news/new_haven_cty/rawlings-arrest-gondola-video#.UIGJVFFcRFI.
4. New Haven Indep., “Stop Resisting!”, YOUTUBE (June 12, 2012),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dMOhKdyxn60&feature=player_embedded.
5. Id.
6. Bass, supra note 1.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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Gondola was taken in for booking, her phone in the custody of the
10
police whose actions were recorded on its data card. It would be
11
returned to Gondola ten days later.
In the weeks that followed, some suggested that Gondola might
file a civil rights lawsuit against Sergeant Rubino and the City of New
12
Haven. The theory was that her video fell within the ambit of the
First Amendment, and that Rubino had violated the Fourth
Amendment by seizing the phone that held it. Indeed, the affair
engendered constitutional concerns not only on the part of Gondola’s
13
14
attorney, but also on the part of the public. For many who weighed
in, schooled in the law or not, the notion that Rubino could seize a
video that might showcase his own illegal conduct was intensely
uncomfortable.
Nevertheless, when Rubino told Gondola that he had a “right to
review” the video and then ordered another officer to take her
15
phone, he almost certainly spoke truthfully and acted lawfully. The
Fourth Amendment’s exigent-circumstances doctrine permits police
to effect a search or seizure, absent a warrant, to prevent the
16
imminent loss of evidence. As long as an officer has probable cause
to believe the seized item is evidence of a crime, and has objectively
reasonable grounds to believe he must act immediately to preserve
17
that evidence, the seizure is reasonable notwithstanding the officer’s
18
subjective motivation or the mere evidentiary nature of the seized
19
material. That calculus changes but little when police seize items
protected by the First Amendment. In such cases, Zurcher v. Stanford

10. Id.
11. Paul Bass & Thomas MacMillan, State Wins Delay To “Research” Camera-Grabbing,
NEW HAVEN INDEP. (June 13, 2012, 3:37 PM), http://www.newhavenindependent.org/
index.php/archives/entry/video_shows_sgt._.
12. Id.
13. See id. (“If ‘any member of the media is filming anything that might involve a crime,’
cops could ‘shortcut the legal process and the legal protections everyone has in the name of
protecting evidence.’” (quoting Gondola’s attorney, Diane Polan)).
14. See, e.g., okaragozian1, Comment to Paul Bass, Rubino: I’ll Be Vindicated, NEW
HAVEN INDEP. (Jun. 7, 2012, 2:16 PM), http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/
archives/entry/rubino_ill_be_vindicated (“[The] 4th Amendment . . . prohibit[s] the ‘taking’ of
the device . . . .”).
15. Bass, supra note 1.
16. Brigham City v. Stewart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
17. Berglund v. City of Maplewood, 173 F. Supp. 2d 935, 943–44 (D. Minn. 2001).
18. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404.
19. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 559 (1978).
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20

Daily requires only that the procedural strictures of the Fourth
21
Amendment be applied with “scrupulous exactitude.” The theory is
that when properly observed, Fourth Amendment procedure affords
22
“sufficient protection” to First Amendment interests.
Should Gondola press her claim, the City of New Haven might
23
rest comfortably on Berglund v. City of Maplewood, a case applying
Zurcher to an exigent-circumstances seizure. In Berglund, the
24
plaintiff, a newsman, argued and fought with police at a banquet. His
25
camera ran throughout the encounter. He claimed that the police
were excessively forceful; the police, that he engaged in disorderly
26
conduct. Berglund was arrested, and the police tried to obtain the
27
tape of the encounter from his coworker. When the coworker
28
refused to release it, the police seized the tape without a warrant. In
29
an action under 42 U.S.C § 1983, Berglund alleged that, because his
video of the violent arrest was First Amendment material, the Fourth
30
Amendment prohibited the seizure.
The District Court for the District of Minnesota disagreed.
Because Berglund’s camera was running during the confrontation, it
was reasonable for police to believe that it contained evidence of a
31
crime—Berglund’s disorderly conduct. It was likewise reasonable for
police to think that evidence might be lost if they did not seize the
tape, because Berglund’s coworker “was in the position to destroy the
video recording . . . [and] the tape could be destroyed, erased or
32
tampered with if they did not take it . . . .” Berglund’s First
Amendment interests did not figure in the exigent-circumstances
analysis at all.

20. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
21. Id. at 564 (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1964)) (quotation marks
omitted).
22. Id. at 565.
23. Berglund v. City of Maplewood, 173 F. Supp. 2d 935 (D. Minn. 2001).
24. Id. at 940–41.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 940.
27. Id. at 941.
28. Id.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). Section 1983 has not been amended since Berglund brought
his suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
30. Berglund, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 942.
31. Id. at 943–44.
32. Id. at 944.
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The seizure of Gondola’s phone neatly tracks Berglund.
33
Gondola, like Berglund, recorded throughout the confrontation,
during which the recorded suspect engaged in behavior that might
34
reasonably be thought criminal. Had she left the scene with her
phone, Gondola, like Berglund’s coworker, would have been “in the
35
position to destroy the video recording” by simply deleting it.
Moreover, Gondola’s demeanor during the arrest—sympathetic
toward the suspect, hostile toward the police—would bolster the
inference that she would not preserve evidence to be used against the
36
suspect in court. Finally, even if the requirement of “scrupulous
exactitude” can ever meaningfully enhance protection for First
Amendment materials—any constitutional provision, it seems, ought
to be scrupulously applied under all circumstances—it counted for
37
little in Berglund, and presumably would not avail Gondola either.
In all this, Officer Rubino’s subjective motivation would be
38
irrelevant. His conduct would enjoy an identical shield whether he
legitimately desired to preserve evidence of a crime or simply wanted
to dispossess Gondola of a recording that depicted his own
39
misconduct.

33. Bass, supra note 1.
34. In Connecticut, a person is guilty of interfering with an officer if he or she “obstructs,
resists, hinders, or endangers any peace officer” in the performance of the peace officer’s duties.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-167a (2010). The suspect’s conduct during the arrest—kicking,
thrashing, profane shouting—seems more than adequate to support the charge. See New Haven
Indep., supra note 4.
35. See Berglund, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 944.
36. See Bass & MacMillan, supra note 11 (describing an exchange in which Gondola
encourages the suspect to “keep quiet” so as to avoid later maltreatment at the hands of police).
37. See Berglund, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 943–44 (engaging the exigent-circumstances analysis in
full without even mentioning the protected nature of the seized recording).
38. See Brigham City v. Stewart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006).
39. This Note does not contend that Rubino did seize Gondola’s phone to suppress its
contents, only that he constitutionally could have. A recent story from Texas brings the problem
into even sharper focus. See Selwyn Crawford & Travis Hudson, Witnesses to End of Chase
Where Garland Officer Fired 41 Shots Say Police Deleted Cell Phone Photos, Video,
DALLASNEWS.COM (Sept. 12, 2012, 8:20 AM), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/
crime/headlines/20120911-witnesses-to-end-of-chase-where-garland-officer-fired-41-shots-saypolice-deleted-cellphone-photos-video.ece. During an automobile chase, a police car hit the
suspect’s truck. Id. An officer fired forty-one shots into the truck, killing the suspect. Id. A
witness claiming that police gave the suspect inadequate time to follow an exit order filmed the
scene using his cell phone just after the event. Id. The witness said that after he finished filming,
officers seized his phone and returned it four days later—with the video deleted. Id.
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In sum, as the doctrine stands today, no part of the exchange
between Rubino and Gondola violated the Constitution of the United
States. This Note argues that should not be so.
40
From Paul Revere’s engraving of the Boston Massacre to the
41
images of Rodney King’s beating in Los Angeles, citizens who
record and publicize the actions of law-enforcement officials have
served the core First Amendment purpose of placing the deeds of
42
government officers before the public for critical examination. For
43
the authors of Cato’s Letters —writings “essential to an
44
understanding of the [F]irst [A]mendment” —the right of the public
to air official misdeeds was the best sign, and the surest guarantee, of
a free people and a healthy government: “A free people will be
shewing that they are so, by their freedom of speech. . . . [I]t is the
part and business of the people, for whose sake alone all public
matters are, or ought to be, transacted, to see whether they be well or
45
ill transacted.”
In recent years, the proliferation of handheld camera phones and
the ease of publishing video on the Internet have allowed citizens like
Gondola to engage First Amendment tradition with considerably
46
more ease than has ever been possible. Cheap, simple, and effective,

40. See Jonathan Eric Pahl, Note, Court-Ordered Restrictions on Trial Participant Speech,
57 DUKE L.J. 1113, 1117 (2008) (describing the public outcry that followed the Massacre and the
publication of Revere’s work).
41. See N. Stewart Hanley, Note, A Dangerous Trend: Arresting Citizens for Recording
Law Enforcement, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 645, 655–56 (2011) (relating the story of King’s
arrest, the public release of the film, and the riots that followed the officers’ acquittal at trial).
42. See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 599 (7th Cir. 2012) (“To the founding
generation, the liberties of speech and press were intimately connected with . . . the right of the
people to see, examine, and be informed of their government.”).
43. JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO’S LETTERS: OR, ESSAYS ON LIBERTY,
CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS, AND OTHER IMPORTANT SUBJECTS (Ronald Hamowy ed., Liberty
Fund 1995) (1720).
44. David Bogen, The Origins of Freedom of Speech and Press, 42 MD. L. REV. 429, 446
(1983).
45. Thomas Gordon, Of Freedom of Speech: That the Same Is Inseparable from Publick
Liberty, in 1 CATO’S LETTERS: OR, ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS, AND OTHER
IMPORTANT SUBJECTS, supra note 43, at 110, 111.
46. And they have engaged it with enthusiasm. See Stephanie Claiborne, Comment, Is It
Justice or a Crime To Record the Police?: A Look at the Illinois Eavesdropping Statute and Its
Application, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 485, 494 (2012) (“There are thousands of postings on
YouTube . . . from civilians that have recorded police officers abusing authority while making
arrests.”).
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recording the police in the digital age offers a unique opportunity for
citizens to serve “a cardinal First Amendment interest” by “gathering
information about government officials in a form that can readily be
48
disseminated.” So it has been that conduct like Bay Area Rapid
49
Transit Officer Johannes Mehserle’s shooting of Oscar Grant, the
50
tasing of college student Andrew Meyer at a political event, and
Rubino’s heavy-handed arrest in New Haven has been placed
immediately in the public eye, engendering debate, outcry, and calls
51
for change.
This Note argues that to ensure the vitality of this opportunity,
courts should reconsider the application of the Fourth Amendment in
cases like Gondola’s. In short, it argues that when a citizen uses a cell
phone to record video of an arrest, police should not be permitted to
physically seize the phone under the exigent-circumstances exception
52
to the warrant requirement. Because of the First Amendment

47. See Steven A. Lautt, Note, Sunlight Is Still the Best Disinfectant: The Case for a First
Amendment Right To Record the Police, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 349, 354 (2012) (“In 1991 [the year
of King’s assault], the chances that someone with a video camera was ‘watching’ were relatively
small . . . . [T]echnological advances of the last decade have ushered in a new, unprecedented
era of heightened police visibility.”).
48. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011).
49. See Jesse Harlan Alderman, Police Privacy in the iPhone Era?: The Need for
Safeguards in State Wiretapping Statutes To Preserve the Civilian’s Right To Record Public
Police Activity, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 487, 488 (2011) (“Mehserle pins . . . Grant face down
against the ground, draws his gun, and fires. . . . [T]he videos instantly appeared on YouTube
and social media websites.”).
50. See Lautt, supra note 47, at 355 (“One illustrative example shows officers holding down
and [t]asing Andrew Meyer, a University of Florida student who had disrupted a campus forum
where Senator John Kerry was speaking. . . . The incident was captured on video from several
different angles and created an Internet phenomenon.”).
51. See, e.g., Lautt, supra note 47, at 355 (“The [Meyer] videos were also instrumental in
sparking serious debate over the use of Tasers on college campuses and a broader debate over
police use of force in general.”); Sean Maher, Protest Against BART Police Expected To Draw
1,000, OAKLAND TRIB. (Jan. 14, 2009), http://www.insidebayarea.com/oakland-bartshooting/ci_11442605 (“More than 1,000 people are expected to march and . . . protest against
the BART police killing of Oscar Grant III . . . . The public outcry has been in response to
witness cell phone videos leaked to the media . . . .”).
52. Some of the arguments that apply to cell phone seizures also apply to the seizure of
other devices that can be used to record arrests, like digital cameras or camcorders. Other
arguments are unique to cell phones. See infra Part III.B. This Note focuses strictly on the
seizure of cell phones used as recording devices for three reasons. First, the Note uses the
Gondola case as a jumping-off point, and Gondola used a cell phone. Second, nearly all the
other citizen-recorders in recent headlines used cell phones when they recorded arrests. See,
e.g., Alderman, supra note 49, at 488 (“In the age of the iPhone . . . it was little surprise that the
passengers captured the footage [of Oscar Grant’s shooting] on cell phones equipped with
digital video cameras . . . .”); Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First
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concerns they engender, such seizures should be deemed
53
unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Outside that narrow constitutional constraint, legislatures would
remain free to craft procedures that balance the needs of law
enforcement with the protection of speech. After surveying a range of
permissible options, this Note urges a policy recently enacted in the
District of Columbia, under which officers are instructed to “seize”
the needed evidence—a video file—by obtaining a duplicate of the
54
file, dispossessing the citizen of neither the phone nor the recording.
Analysis proceeds in four Parts. Part I makes the case for a First
Amendment right to film police activity in public areas, concluding
that either of two separate theories supports the existence of such a
right. Part II examines the interplay between the Fourth and First
Amendments in two contexts. In the first area, the seizure of
allegedly obscene materials, the Supreme Court has sought to protect
First Amendment interests by imposing procedural strictures beyond
the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. It has justified those
enhanced protections by reference to two First Amendment concerns:
a wariness about prior restraints and a fear of chilling protected
55
speech. In the second area, the use of a warrant to search a
newspaper office in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, the Court seemed to
adopt a less speech-protective approach. It defined the scope of the
newspaper’s protection by the procedural strictures of the Fourth

Amendment, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 337 (2011) (“In the aftermath of the Iranian election during
the summer of 2009, authorities sought to impede reporting on efforts to suppress opposition
demonstrators. Yet cell phone videos disseminated over social-networking sites illuminated
both official abuse and the scope of civil resistance.”). Third, the seizure of a cell phone
implicates some interests not at play in the case of, for instance, a camcorder seizure, see infra
Part III.B, so the First Amendment calculus differs from one to the other. Rather than assess
the constitutional significance of seizures across a broad spectrum of devices, this Note adopts a
narrower focus.
53. This argument is in many ways a particularized application of Professor Akhil Amar’s
admonition that Fourth Amendment doctrine should take account of “constitutional
reasonableness”: “In thinking about the broad command of the Fourth Amendment, we must
examine other parts of the Bill of Rights to identify constitutional values that are elements of
constitutional reasonableness.” Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107
HARV. L. REV. 757, 805 (1994) (footnote omitted).
54. See infra Part IV.C. The term “seize” is here used in the colloquial sense, not the
constitutional sense. Determining whether and when the District’s policy amounts to a Fourth
Amendment seizure of a person, her phone, or her video file is beyond the scope of this Note.
Much more importantly, it is unnecessary in this piece, which focuses on only those cases in
which the presence of exigent circumstances justifies a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. See supra notes 33−37 and accompanying text.
55. See infra Part II.A.
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Amendment, not the substantive values of the First. But the Court
did so only after carefully considering and ultimately rejecting the
argument that searches like the one before it would impose prior
56
restraints on speech and chill expression. Part III returns to the
question of exigent-circumstances seizures of cell phones. Using
Rubino’s seizure of Gondola’s cell phone as the paradigm, it argues
that such seizures can function as egregious prior restraints on speech
and likely deter citizens from recording police. It therefore concludes
that cell phone seizures should not be governed by Zurcher’s broad
rule. Like obscenity seizures, cell phone seizures are good candidates
for heightened protections crafted to insulate First Amendment
values. Part IV considers several potential safeguards, concluding that
two interests—the First Amendment interest in government
monitoring, and law enforcement’s interest in preserving crime
evidence—are best served if police officers “seize” video by
mandating its electronic transmission, not by physically seizing cell
phones.
This Note therefore argues that courts should deem seizures like
Gondola’s unreasonable, trusting that legislatures can prescribe a
procedure that serves the needs of police without doing violence to
the First Amendment.
I. THE CASE FOR A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO FILM POLICE
“[T]here is practically universal agreement,” wrote the Supreme
57
Court in Mills v. Alabama, “that a major purpose of [the First]
Amendment [is] to protect the free discussion of governmental
58
affairs.” It can hardly be doubted that the act of recording lawenforcement officers, and submitting images of official conduct for
evaluation by the public, lies close to the heart of the First
Amendment’s spirit. The question is whether existing constitutional
doctrine accommodates such behavior. This Part examines four
theories of First Amendment protection that have been advanced by
commentators or considered by courts. It dismisses the first two as
doctrinally unsound, but concludes that each of the latter two theories
supports the claim that the act of recording police is within the aegis
of the First Amendment.

56. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565−66 (1978); see infra Part II.B.
57. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
58. Id. at 218.
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A. Recording as Expressive Conduct Per Se
A citizen silently recording an arrest is not “speaking” in the
usual sense. But the First Amendment extends protection to conduct
59
that is “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication.” One
commentator argues that the recording act meets this threshold, and
can claim protection as an expressive act calculated to send a message
in and of itself: “[A]larm or distrust of officers, or emotional support
60
for an accused.”
This theory is likely foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s holding
61
in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. In
Rumsfeld, the Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, “an
62
association of law schools and law faculties,” argued that law
schools’ exclusion of military recruiters from their campuses qualified
as expressive conduct, intended to express disapproval of the
63
military’s practice of discriminating based on sexual orientation. The
Court disagreed, holding that such conduct was not “inherently
expressive” because it did not communicate a clear message without
64
additional accompanying speech. The absence of recruiters from
campus might indicate only that “the law school’s interview rooms
65
[were] full,” or that the military preferred to interview elsewhere.
The claim that recording police activity is expressive conduct
suffers from the same infirmity: recording, without more, is
ambiguous. Impassive filming might indicate support for the victim
(by monitoring official conduct), support for the police (by gathering
evidence of a crime and the attendant arrest), or support for nobody
in particular (in the fashion of an objective newsgatherer). The
recording act likely finds no constitutional shield as expressive
conduct.

59. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S.
405, 409 (1974)) (quotation mark omitted).
60. Mario Cerame, Note, The Right To Record Police in Connecticut, 30 QUINNIPIAC L.
REV. 385, 417 (2012).
61. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
62. Id. at 47–48.
63. Id. at 51–53.
64. Id. at 66.
65. Id.
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B. Recording, Standing Alone, as Falling Within a “Right To Gather
Information”
An enticing theory of protection for recording rests on
66
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, in which a plurality of the
Court held that “the amalgam of the First Amendment guarantees of
speech and press,” as well as assembly, protects the right to observe
67
proceedings at criminal trials. The Court reasoned that “[p]eople
assemble in public places not only to speak or to take action, but also
to listen, observe, and learn,” and that traditionally, the public had
been permitted access to criminal proceedings because public
presence “has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of
68
what takes place.” It is plausible to argue that the “integrity and
quality” of police conduct is every bit as important as the “integrity
and quality” of judicial conduct, and the spaces where recording tends
69
to occur are as public as a courtroom. Recording, the argument
concludes, should therefore fall comfortably within the protective
scope of Richmond Newspapers. The syllogism is sound as far as it
goes, but its major premise, Richmond Newspapers, is flawed.
First, Richmond Newspapers is arguably at odds with Zemel v.
70
Rusk, in which the Court held that a ban on travel to Cuba—though
it compromised the appellant’s efforts to collect information about
71
U.S. foreign policy—did not implicate the First Amendment. It is
easy to see why “[t]he right to speak and publish does not carry with
72
it the unrestrained right to gather information;” it is harder to see
why Zemel should come out differently than Richmond Newspapers.
73
Americans travelled freely to Cuba until the 1961 ban, just as
74
citizens have traditionally enjoyed access to courtrooms. The
appellant in each case sought access to a traditionally open forum to
66. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
67. Id. at 577–78 (plurality opinion).
68. Id. at 578.
69. See, e.g., Alderman, supra note 49, at 488 (describing the Mehserle shooting, which
occurred on a subway platform); Bass, supra note 1 (describing the plaza where Gondola
recorded the arrest).
70. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
71. Id. at 16–17. The Court held that the law was a restriction on action, not on speech. Id.
72. Id. at 17.
73. Id. at 3.
74. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 578 (1980) (plurality opinion)
(“[A] trial courtroom also is a public place where the people generally . . . have a right to be
present, and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and
quality of what takes place.”).
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75

collect information of public import. And it is “hard to contend that
the way in which a government operates its criminal justice system is
of any greater concern from a democratic-decisionmaking point of
76
view than the impact of its foreign policy.”
Second, as Zemel suggests, a robust First Amendment right to
77
“gather information” is simply impractical. Gathering information is,
after all, incidental to practically the entire universe of human
conduct. Affording that conduct constitutional privilege would throw
wide the First Amendment’s doors to an enormous range of behavior
entirely divorced from any affirmative act of speaking. As Professor
Barry McDonald points out, such a rule “confuse[s] means with
78
ends.” That is, the Framers valued the acquisition of information,
but they chose to facilitate it by protecting the speech constituting the
79
information, not by policing the acquisition directly.
Third, the Court has been decidedly chary about extending
Richmond Newspapers beyond its origins in the criminal courtroom.
In Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing
80
Corp., for instance, the Court considered a law that denied access to
81
address information of arrested persons for commercial purposes.
The plaintiff argued that Richmond Newspapers should be extended
82
to embrace these facts. But as Professor McDonald notes, the
majority, dissenting, and concurring opinions all accepted that
“California could have withheld the arrestee address information
from the public without violating the First Amendment,” and none so
83
much as mentioned Richmond Newspapers. Professor McDonald
concludes that, in United Reporting, “the Court signaled that any
person attempting to expand the Richmond Newspapers right of
access beyond its current moorings may well bear a significant burden
84
in doing so.”
75. Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards
a Realistic Right To Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 326
(2004).
76. Id.
77. See Zemel, 381 U.S. at 16–17 (“There are few restrictions on action which could not be
clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow.”).
78. McDonald, supra note 75, at 327 (emphasis omitted).
79. Id. at 327.
80. L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999).
81. Id. at 35.
82. McDonald, supra note 75, at 301.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 302.
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Thus, the facts of police recording present a fair argument from
Richmond Newspapers, but the case is unlikely to prove a font of
meaningful protection. The plea for First Amendment solicitude is
not best made with a focus on the act of recording alone.
C. ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez: Recording as Conduct Integral to
Wholly Protected Speech
The first winning argument for constitutional protection couches
recording as part and parcel of a continuing act of speech. In ACLU
85
of Illinois v. Alvarez, the Seventh Circuit relied on this reasoning to
strike down an eavesdropping statute that proscribed the audio
recording of any conversation in the absence of consent from all
86
parties.
The argument works from the premise that “[a]s a general
matter, ‘state action to punish the publication of truthful information
87
seldom can satisfy constitutional standards.’” It then looks backward
from dissemination of the recording, undoubtedly protected, to the
88
conduct necessary to produce it in the first instance, and recognizes
that there is “no fixed First Amendment line between the act of
creating speech and the speech itself: . . . ‘The process of
expression . . . has never been thought so distinct from the expression
itself that we could disaggregate Picasso from his brushes and
89
canvas . . . .’”
“This observation,” the Alvarez court reasoned, “holds true
90
when the expressive medium is mechanical rather than manual.”
And because “‘[l]aws enacted to control or suppress speech may

85. ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012).
86. Id. at 586, 596. The ACLU desired to “implement a ‘program of promoting police
accountability by openly audio recording police officers without their consent.’” Id. at 588.
87. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527 (2001) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co.,
443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979)).
88. This view requires the assumption that dissemination is intended; otherwise, it smacks
of Richmond Newspapers and an unbounded right to gather information. Courts have generally
been willing to make that assumption. See, e.g., Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 586, 596 (reasoning
backward from dissemination when the ACLU sought to record police as part of its “police
accountability program”); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Gathering
information about government officials in a form that can readily be disseminated to others
serves a cardinal First Amendment interest . . . .”).
89. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 596 (quoting Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051,
1061–62 (9th Cir. 2010)).
90. Id. That is, when the object of regulation is a camera, not a paintbrush.
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operate at different points in the speech process,’” to proscribe the
creative act is functionally to prohibit the dissemination of the created
92
product. The front-end ban implicates the First Amendment as
surely as a back-end regulation, and the recording act merits the full
93
protection of the Speech Clause.
This is not to suggest that the intent to gather and disseminate
information transforms any restriction on conduct into a restriction
on speech. Zemel should not have come out differently if the
challenger had wanted to write a news article about Cuba. And this
Note does not quarrel with the result in, for instance, Pell v.
94
Procunier, in which the Court held that the press enjoys no First
95
Amendment right to enter prisons to interview prisoners. This Part
asks whether the government may curtail information gathering in a
place the citizen has a right to be, not whether it must allow the
citizen to access certain places so that she might gather information
there. The argument is not that the government must facilitate speech
by throwing wide the prison doors, but that it must suffer speech in
accordance with the First Amendment’s negative injunction.
D. Glik v. Cunniffe: Protection Under the Press Clause
The second persuasive argument for protection differs little from
the one advanced in Alvarez, but warrants special mention. In Glik v.
96
Cunniffe, the First Circuit held that the First Amendment protects
the right of private citizens to film “government officials engaged in
97
their duties in a public place,” and seemed to ground the right in the
province of the press.
The first part of the analysis in Glik largely paralleled Alvarez’s
reasoning: “Gathering information about government officials in a
91. Id. (quoting Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 336 (2010)).
92. See id. at 597 (“If . . . the eavesdropping statute does not implicate the First
Amendment at all, the State could effectively control or suppress speech by the simple
expedient of restricting an early step in the speech process rather than the end result.”).
93. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”).
94. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
95. Id. at 832−35.
96. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).
97. Id. at 82. In Glik, a man walking near Boston Common saw three police officers
arresting a suspect. Id. at 79. He thought the officers were being rough with the suspect and used
his cell phone to film the arrest from a comfortable remove. Id. at 79–80. The officers ordered
him to stop, then arrested him for violating Massachusetts’s wiretap statute, disturbing the
peace, and aiding in the escape of a prisoner. Id. at 80. Glik was his § 1983 action. Id. at 79–80.
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form that can readily be disseminated to others serves a cardinal First
98
Amendment interest.” The First Circuit did not articulate the source
of this right within the First Amendment, and used neither the term
“free speech” nor the term “free press.” But in the second part of its
analysis, the court emphasized that the challenger’s behavior was
protected notwithstanding his lack of affiliation with the organized
media: the “public’s right of access to information is coextensive with
99
that of the press.” Constitutional protection for newsgathering,
100
wrote the court, “cannot turn on professional credentials.”
This invocation of the principle that the Press Clause protects a
101
function, not a profession, suggests a right nestled within the
freedom of the press rather than the freedom of speech. That
suggestion is at odds with nearly four decades of jurisprudence that
has “mainly treated the Press Clause as a superfluous subset of the
102
Speech Clause,” but at least one commentator has argued that the
Press Clause can naturally cabin a “right to gather information” in a
way the Speech Clause cannot—and is therefore the sensible source
103
of the right. Glik does not stake out that position in so many words,
but the case might stand for a second theory of protection, one resting
on a reinvigorated Press Clause.
***
It does not really matter whether Alvarez’s speech theory or
Glik’s press theory carries the day. Each is at heart the same: the act
of gathering information by recording rides to protection on the
coattails of intended dissemination. No matter which clause does the
work—whether a prohibition on recording restricts the dissemination
of “speech” at square one, or such a proscription imperils the
“press”—the First Amendment protects a right to record public
officials performing their duties.
Indeed, at least two Federal Courts of Appeals have announced
such a right without articulating any doctrinal justification at all. In

98. Id. at 82.
99. Id. at 83.
100. Id. at 84.
101. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) (“[T]he First Amendment does not
guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the
public generally.”).
102. McDonald, supra note 75, at 258.
103. Id. at 354–55.
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Smith v. City of Cumming, the Eleventh Circuit held that “[t]he
First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what
public officials do on public property,” specifically to “record matters
105
of public interest.” The court did not announce which clause does
106
the work, or how. Likewise, in Fordyce v. City of Seattle, the Ninth
Circuit simply recognized a “First Amendment right to film matters
107
of public interest,” without saying more. Protection by ipse dixit
admittedly fails to satisfy. But the federal reporters are bereft of cases
denying protection to the recording act, and the full protection of the
First Amendment stands as the law of four circuits.
In sum, the starting point is this: whatever the theory, all citizens
enjoy the constitutional right to film official actions undertaken by
108
the police in the public square.
II. THE INTERSECTION OF THE FIRST AND FOURTH AMENDMENTS
“What is significant to note,” wrote the Court in Stanford v.
109
Texas, is that the history of the Fourth Amendment “is largely a
110
history of conflict between the Crown and the press.” That “history
111
of conflict,” characterized by the use of general warrants to seize
publications tending toward seditious libel and dramatized in English
112
113
cases like Entick v. Carrington and Wilkes v. Wood, set the stage
for the adoption of the Fourth Amendment as a barrier between the

104. Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2000). Smith concerned a § 1983
claim in which the plaintiff alleged he had been prevented from videotaping police activity. Id.
at 1332.
105. Id. at 1333.
106. Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436 (9th Cir. 1995). Fordyce, like Smith, was a § 1983
action, arising from the plaintiff’s arrest while filming a local protest. Id. at 438.
107. Id. at 439.
108. This recording right is (like all speech) “subject to reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions.” Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011). Because police recording by
definition occurs during and near sensitive law-enforcement operations, laws designed to limit
interference and protect bystanders (including filmers) will cabin the particulars of the
recording act. But the core right, to record “an arrest in a public space . . . [without] interfer[ing]
with the police officers’ performance of their duties,” id., runs as deep as any protection found
within the First Amendment.
109. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
110. Id. at 482.
111. Id.
112. Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.).
113. Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.).
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114

prying state and the private papers of the citizenry. Constitutional
limits on searches and seizures, in other words, were from the start
115
bound up with First Amendment concerns.
Part II considers the interplay of the First and Fourth
Amendments in two more contemporary arenas. In the first, the
Court’s line of cases on the seizure of alleged obscenity, doctrine has
been driven by two concerns peculiar to the First Amendment:
unwillingness to abide prior restraints on expression and fear of
chilling protected speech. Part II.A shows that in these cases, First
Amendment substantive values, not Fourth Amendment procedural
strictures, have defined the contours of limits on seizures.
But in the second area—the Court’s decision in Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, concerning an evidentiary seizure from a newspaper
office—the Court held just the opposite, defining the substantive
protections of the First Amendment by the Fourth’s procedural
116
limitations. Part II.B considers a holding that seems on its face to
have renegotiated the limits by which the Constitution protects
expressive material made subject to the government’s power to seize.
Taken together, these two areas of doctrine will frame later
discussion about how the Fourth Amendment bears on Jennifer
Gondola’s right to film an arrest.
A. Obscenity and the First and Fourth Amendments
The lion’s share of the case law addressing the “collision between
the Fourth Amendment and the First Amendment” has arisen in the
117
context of obscenity. In that area, the uncertain nature of the line
between that which can be legitimately proscribed and that which is
118
constitutionally protected
has given rise to thorny questions

114. Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 VA. L. REV. 869,
875–77 (1985).
115. See Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
112, 133 (2007) (“The First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments share a common background in
concerns about seditious libel.”); William Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal
Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 402–03 (1995) (“Entick and Wilkes are classic First Amendment
cases in a system with no First Amendment . . . .”).
116. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564–65 (1978).
117. Tattered Cover v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044, 1055 (Colo. 2002) (en banc).
118. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), defines unprotected obscenity; its standard has
often been criticized as unclear. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 103 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he concept of ‘obscenity’ cannot be defined with sufficient
specificity and clarity to . . . prevent substantial erosion of protected speech as a byproduct of
the attempt to suppress unprotected speech . . . .”).
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concerning the state’s power to seize prohibited obscene materials.
The Court’s answer has often been that the normal strictures of the
Fourth Amendment are not equal to the task of protecting the First
Amendment interests at stake—that “[a] seizure reasonable as to one
type of material in one setting may be unreasonable in a different
119
setting or with respect to another kind of material.” The Court has
justified the imposition of heightened procedural requirements by
reference to two First Amendment concerns: a wariness about prior
restraints on expression and a fear of chilling protected speech.
1. The Seizure of Obscenity and Prior Restraint. “If one constant
exists in Supreme Court [F]irst [A]mendment theory, it is that ‘[a]ny
prior restraint on expression comes to . . . [the] Court with a ‘heavy
120
presumption’ against its constitutional validity.’” The chief concern
animating the prior restraint doctrine is that the hand of the
government censor will operate to exclude disfavored speech before
121
the speech reaches the public market. In the context of obscenity
seizures, this danger is particularly acute. The indefinite nature of the
obscenity standard, and of statutes that track that standard, lends
itself to discretionary official action that suppresses protected speech
122
as well as proscribed obscenity. The Court has long taken care to
guard against that.
123
In Marcus v. Search Warrant, the Court recognized that a
search warrant arguably unobjectionable in another context may
constitute an impermissible prior restraint when aimed at
presumptively protected speech. In Marcus, a Missouri judge issued a
search warrant for a periodical distributor’s warehouse on the
124
strength of an officer’s affidavit that it housed obscene magazines.
The warrant authorized the seizure of all “obscene materials” located
at the warehouse, and the executing officers seized “[a]pproximately
125
11,000 copies of 280 publications.” Writing for the Court, Justice
119. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 501 (1973).
120. Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment
Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 53 (1984) (alteration in original) (quoting Org. for a Better Austin v.
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).
121. See Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 736–37 (1961) (“The public’s opportunity
to obtain the publications was . . . determined by the distributor’s readiness and ability to outwit
the police by obtaining and selling other copies before they in turn could be seized.”).
122. See supra note 118.
123. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
124. Id. at 722.
125. Id. at 722–23.
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Brennan—after a lengthy ode to the Fourth Amendment’s origin as a
126
safeguard against the suppression of speech and press —
characterized the warrant as an impermissible prior restraint on
127
expression.
Whether a similar warrant could be issued for the seizure of
“gambling paraphernalia or other contraband,” wrote Justice
128
Brennan, was beside the point. Absent preseizure procedures
designed to “focus searchingly on the question of obscenity,” a
narrower warrant eliminating police discretion, and “an adversary
proceeding on the issue of obscenity,” imposition of a prior restraint
129
on dissemination was impermissible. Despite a statutory provision
for “rapid trial of the issue of obscenity” following seizure, the Court
130
invalidated the authorizing Missouri law. Adversary action, the
131
Court indicated, must precede the imposition of restraint.
The Court took up the question again in A Quantity of Copies of
132
Books v. Kansas, there confronting the seizure, by warrant, of all
133
1,715 copies of thirty-one titles from a distributor. The procedures
observed in A Quantity of Copies of Books exceeded in rigor those
followed in Marcus. The warrant named particular titles to reduce
discretion in execution, and the issuing judge conducted an ex parte
inquiry, in which he “scrutinized” seven books, and found grounds to
134
believe they were obscene.
This, wrote Justice Brennan for the plurality, was not enough:
“[S]ince the warrant here authorized the sheriff to seize all copies of
the specified titles, and since [the distributor] was not afforded a
hearing on the question of . . . obscenity . . . before the warrant issued,

126. See id. at 724 (“[T]he struggle for freedom of speech and press in England was bound
up with the issue of the scope of the search and seizure power.”); id. at 729 (“This history was,
of course, part of the intellectual matrix within which our own constitutional fabric was
shaped.”).
127. See id. at 736 (“[A]n effective restraint . . . was imposed prior to hearing on the
circulation of the publications in this case, because all copies on which the police could lay their
hands were physically removed from the newsstands . . . . The public’s opportunity to obtain the
publications was thus determined by the distributor’s readiness and ability to outwit the
police . . . .”).
128. Id. at 730–31.
129. See id. at 732–38.
130. Id. at 737–38.
131. Id. at 736–38.
132. A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
133. Id. at 208–09 (plurality opinion).
134. Id. at 208.
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the procedure was . . . constitutionally deficient.” Justice Brennan
again emphasized that the First Amendment does not necessarily
abide seizures of expressive material that might be permissible with
respect to other items: “It is no answer to say that obscene books are
contraband, and that consequently the standards governing searches
and seizures of allegedly obscene books should not differ from those
applied with respect to narcotics, gambling paraphernalia and other
136
contraband. We rejected that proposition in Marcus.”
A Quantity of Copies of Books thus stands for the proposition
that when a seizure operates as a restraint on a seller’s distribution of
each copy of a particular title, the seizure is impermissible if not
preceded by an adversary hearing on obscenity. An otherwise
sufficient warrant will not cure the constitutional defect.
137
In two later cases, Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia and Roaden
138
v. Kentucky, the Court invalidated the seizures of films from adult
theatres. In Lee Art Theatre, a warrant issued “solely upon the
139
conclusory assertions of [a] police officer” who had viewed the film.
The Court held that without judicial scrutiny, the procedure was not
140
one “‘designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity.’”
In Roaden, the Court held that the warrantless evidentiary seizure of
a single reel of film incident to the theatre manager’s arrest for
141
displaying obscenity involved the same infirmity.
What is
remarkable about Lee Art Theatre and Roaden is not the procedural
particulars either case announced for obscenity seizures—each
focused only on the lack of preseizure scrutiny by a judge, not on the
142
absence of preseizure adversary hearings —but the Court’s
sensitivity to seizures that operate as prior restraints on expression:
[T]he material seized fell arguably within First Amendment
protection, and the taking brought to an abrupt halt an orderly and

135. Id. at 210.
136. Id. at 211–12.
137. Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636 (1968) (per curiam).
138. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973).
139. Lee Art Theatre, 392 U.S. at 637.
140. Id. (quoting Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961)).
141. See Roaden, 413 U.S. at 504 (“Such precipitate action by a police officer, without the
authority of a constitutionally sufficient warrant, is plainly a form of prior restraint and is, in
those circumstances, unreasonable under Fourth Amendment standards.”).
142. In his Roaden concurrence, Justice Brennan wrote that the Kentucky statute was
unconstitutionally overbroad because it did not require such a hearing before the seizure of
obscene materials incident to arrest. Id. at 507 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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presumptively legitimate distribution or exhibition. Seizing a film
then being exhibited to the general public presents essentially the
same restraint on expression as the seizure of all the books in a
bookstore. . . . [R]estraint of . . . expression, whether by books or
films, calls for a higher hurdle in the evaluation of
reasonableness. . . . [W]e examine what is “unreasonable” in the
143
light of the values of freedom of expression.

Roaden’s conception of restraint is broad and speech protective.
The purpose of the seizure in Roaden was not, as in Marcus or A
Quantity of Copies of Books, to remove objectionable material from
144
circulation. It was rather to gather evidence in a criminal case. The
officer did not seize thousands of publications, as in the prior cases.
145
He took only one copy of the film. Roaden’s touchstone of concern
is neither the seizure’s purpose nor the quantity of the items seized; it
is whether official action disrupts “orderly and presumptively
146
legitimate distribution or exhibition.” When it does, the Court
signaled, the action will be treated as a prior restraint and must clear
147
the “higher hurdle in the evaluation of reasonableness” expressed in
Marcus, A Quantity of Copies of Books, Lee Art Theatre, and Roaden.
In keeping with the principle that prior restraints on
dissemination trigger heightened procedural requirements, the Court
has declined to impose comparable procedural rigor in their absence.
148
Heller v. New York was decided the same day as Roaden and
involved, like Roaden, the seizure of one copy of an allegedly obscene
149
film incident to the arrest of theatre employees. The Court
nonetheless upheld the seizure, on the ground that “[t]here ha[d]
been no showing that the seizure of a copy of the film precluded its

143. Id. at 504. Roaden’s language differs somewhat from the language in the earlier
obscenity cases. Marcus, for instance, invalidated a seizure strictly by reference to the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, see Marcus, 367 U.S. at 738, but Roaden found that a seizure was
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, Roaden, 413 U.S. at 504. The difference is one
more of mechanism than of meaning—Roaden simply defined Fourth Amendment
reasonableness according to First Amendment interests, an operation very much in keeping
with Professor Akhil Amar’s theory of “constitutional reasonableness.” See generally Amar,
supra note 53.
144. Roaden, 413 U.S. at 497–98 (“[T]he sheriff seized one copy of the film for use as
evidence.”).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 504.
147. Id.
148. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973).
149. Id. at 485–86. In Heller, unlike Roaden, the seizure was by warrant. Id.
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continued exhibition.” Likewise, in New York v. P.J. Video, Inc.,
the Court relied on Heller to hold that absent a “claim that the
152
seizure . . . prevented continuing exhibition of the film,” the seizure
153
of several copies of each of ten films from a rental store, made
pursuant to a proper warrant and with an opportunity for a prompt
154
adversary hearing on obscenity, was permissible.
In short, the Court’s jurisprudence concerning the seizure of
allegedly obscene materials teaches that when the seizure of
potentially protected expression functions as a prior restraint on
dissemination, free speech controls. First Amendment interests justify
the imposition of heightened procedural requirements on seizures
that might be in another context unobjectionable.
2. The Seizure of Obscenity and Chilling Effects. The chillingeffect doctrine, like the fear of prior restraints, is grounded in the
concern that official action will prevent protected speech from
reaching the market. The worry is not, as in the context of prior
restraints, that direct regulation will sweep valuable speech into its
155
restrictive scope. Rather, it is that individuals will unnecessarily self156
censor in an effort to steer wide of the regulated zone.
The possibility of chilling protected speech has special salience
with respect to obscenity statutes because of the vagueness inherent
157
in anti-obscenity laws that track the constitutional standard. If
“[o]bscenity cannot be distinguished ex ante from constitutionally

150. Id. at 490. The Court wrote that if no other copies of the film were available, it would
be necessary to “permit the seized film to be copied so that showing can be continued pending a
judicial determination of the obscenity issue in an adversary proceeding.” Id. at 492–93.
151. New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868 (1986).
152. Id. at 874 (quoting Heller, 413 U.S. at 492).
153. Id. at 870.
154. Id. at 874–76.
155. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 344–45 (1967) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“To give these freedoms the necessary ‘breathing space to survive,’ the Court
has . . . molded both substantive rights and procedural remedies . . . to conform to our
overriding duty to insulate all individuals from the ‘chilling effect’ upon exercise of First
Amendment freedoms generated by vagueness, overbreadth and unbridled discretion to limit
their exercise.” (citations omitted) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963))).
156. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154 (1959) (explaining that if a strict-liability antiobscenity statute were permitted to stand, “[t]he bookseller’s self-censorship, compelled by the
State, would be a censorship affecting the whole public”).
157. See supra note 118.
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158

protected sexually explicit material,” a sensible purveyor of any
sexually explicit material errs toward the nondistribution of
questionable matter, and so declines to disseminate some protected,
nonobscene speech. Justice Brennan urged that this “potentially
159
inhibiting effect” justified the wholesale scrapping of the Court’s
160
efforts to define an unprotected sphere of obscenity. Justice
Brennan’s view never commanded votes from more than three other
161
Justices in any one case, and the Court has made clear that though
the imposition of penalties under an obscenity statute that tracks
Miller might chill protected speech, that alone will not invalidate the
162
statute. But the Court has relied on chilling-effect reasoning to
invalidate statues that fail to achieve Miller’s clarity and so work
163
supposed deterrence on protected speech. In Reno v. ACLU, for
164
example, the Court held that the Communications Decency Act
(CDA) was unacceptably vague because its definition of proscribed
165
and
material lacked several of Miller’s narrowing elements,
therefore “present[ed] a great[] threat of censoring speech that, in
166
fact, [fell] outside the statute’s scope.”
The seizure of alleged obscenity by a procedurally deficient
warrant functions like, and raises the same concerns as, a vague
statute like the CDA. A warrant like the one in Marcus, for
167
example, injects uncertainty into the obscenity standard by vesting
the executing officer with discretion to make the obscenity judgment
158. John T. Mitchell, An Exclusionary Rule Framework for Protecting Obscenity, 10 J.L. &
POL. 183, 199 (1994).
159. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 88 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Smith, 361 U.S. at 151).
160. Id. at 103 (“[T]he concept of ‘obscenity’ cannot be defined with sufficient specificity
and clarity to . . . prevent substantial erosion of protected speech as a byproduct of the attempt
to suppress unprotected speech . . . .”).
161. Mitchell, supra note 158, at 197.
162. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 60 (1989).
163. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
164. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. V, 110 Stat. 56, 133–43,
invalidated in part by Reno, 521 U.S. 844.
165. Reno, 521 U.S. at 873–74. The statute banned the electronic transmission of “patently
offensive” sexual matter, Communications Decency Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at 134, but it lacked
Miller’s requirement that the matter be sexual conduct “specifically defined by the applicable
state law.” Reno, 521 U.S. at 873 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)). The
CDA’s statutory definition of proscribed material further omitted Miller’s other two prongs:
that the material appeal to the prurient interest and that the banned work, taken as a whole,
lack serious political, scientific, literary, or artistic value. Id.
166. Id. at 871–74.
167. See supra notes 124−29 and accompanying text.
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on the ground. That uncertainty in turn expands the scope of
expression a distributor must self-censor to avoid seizure and
prosecution. And so, in the obscenity-seizure cases, the Court was
wary of the chilling effect of the power to seize.
In Marcus, for instance, the Court opened its analysis with the
observation that “a State’s power to suppress obscenity is limited by
168
the constitutional protections for free expression.”
It then
elaborated on those protections in a discussion of Smith v.
169
California, justifying by reference to Smith its holding that a warrant
to seize obscenity must be treated differently than a warrant to seize
170
other contraband. In Smith, the Court had held that states may not
regulate the distribution of obscenity under a strict-liability regime. It
rested that holding on the premise that such a scheme would
unacceptably chill the distribution of nonobscene materials:
[I]f the bookseller is criminally liable without knowledge of the
contents [of obscene materials] . . . he will tend to restrict the books
he sells to those he has inspected; and thus the State will have
imposed a restriction upon the distribution of constitutionally
protected as well as obscene literature. . . . The bookseller’s selfcensorship, compelled by the State, would be a censorship affecting
the whole public, hardly less virulent for being privately
171
administered.

Self-censorship, by Smith’s lights, functions as a de facto stateimposed restriction on speech. Resting in part on that logic, the Court
172
held in Marcus that Missouri’s defective procedures “lacked the
safeguards which due process demands to assure nonobscene material
173
the constitutional protection to which it is entitled.” Procedures
inadequate to parse the obscene from the merely explicit in the first
instance permit not only the direct suppression of protected speech,
but the indirect suppression of expression that moved the Court in
Smith. In Marcus, the Court sought to avoid that end by imposing
heightened procedural requirements ensuring that warrants to seize
174
obscenity would indeed target only the obscene.

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 730 (1961).
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
Marcus, 367 U.S. at 730–31.
Smith, 361 U.S. at 153–54.
See supra notes 124–31 and accompanying text.
Marcus, 367 U.S. at 731.
See supra notes 127–31 and accompanying text.
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It is fair to wonder why the Court, intent on policing the chilling
effect of seizures, would decline to impose heightened procedural
requirements on evidentiary seizures of obscenity that do not
175
represent prior restraints, as it did in Heller and P.J. Video. Indeed,
P.J. Video has been criticized for “ignor[ing] . . . the chilling effect
that even an evidentiary seizure can have on the dissemination of
176
177
protected speech.” And in Maryland v. Macon, in which the Court
permitted the evidentiary use of two obscene publications taken
178
without a warrant from an adult bookstore, a dissenting Justice
Brennan warned of consequences falling “not only upon the specific
victims of abuse . . . but also upon all those who, for fear of being
subjected to official harassment, steer far wider of the forbidden zone
179
than they otherwise would.”
The Court has not explained why the chilling-effect rationale
does not justify the extension of Roaden’s “higher hurdle” to mere
evidentiary seizures, but the answer is probably, like every chilling180
effect inquiry, a matter of on-the-ground pragmatism. Because the
Constitution bars prosecution for the private possession of
181
obscenity, Marcus and its progeny—the entire line of obscenity182
seizure cases—concern vendors of objectionable material. In that
context, one expects that only financially burdensome seizures would
deter speech. The inclination to avoid shame, embarrassment, or
invasion of privacy might be a relevant mover for seizures from the
home, but those concerns likely lack salience when a commercial
entity is the object of investigation.
Viewed in that light, the Court’s imposition of heightened
procedural burdens for prior-restraint seizures, but not for most
evidentiary seizures, neatly tracks the capacity of each type of seizure
to chill protected speech. The mass seizure of eleven thousand

175. See supra notes 148–54 and accompanying text.
176. James H. Jeffries, Note, Seizing Obscenity: New York v. P.J. Video, Inc. and the
Waning of Presumptive Protection, 65 N.C. L. REV. 799, 812–13 (1987).
177. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985).
178. Id. at 465.
179. Id. at 476 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
180. See Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808, 808 (1969)
(“The chilling effect focuses attention on the practical consequences of state action . . . .”).
181. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
182. See, e.g., New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 869 (1986) (“[F]ive videocassette
movies . . . had been seized from respondents’ store . . . .”); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S.
717, 721 (1961) (“Appellant . . . is a wholesale distributor of magazines . . . .”).
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183

books, or even the seizure of one reel of film that halts its planned
184
exhibition, disrupts the ordered run of business and imposes
financial burdens a merchant might seek to avoid by giving obscenity
a needlessly wide berth. On the other hand, the seizure of less than all
185
of a theatre’s copies of a film neither disturbs operations nor
threatens profits. It therefore seems doubtful that a preseizure
adversary hearing would insulate protected speech any better than
186
prompt postseizure proceedings. Heightened procedural strictures
for evidentiary seizures would impose burdensome niceties on the
state without a correlative salutary effect on expression, and the
Court has sensibly eschewed them.
To summarize, the seizure of alleged obscenity represents a
collision between the state’s power to seize and society’s freedom to
speak. Guided by concerns about prior restraints and chilling effects,
the Court has defined procedural requirements with reference to First
Amendment interests, not Fourth Amendment authority. That is
why, at first blush, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily seems to break with its
precursors.
B. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily
The First and Fourth Amendments collided again when Zurcher
v. Stanford Daily came to the Court in 1978. Seven years earlier,
demonstrators in Palo Alto had seized and occupied the offices at
187
188
Stanford University Hospital. Some had attacked police officers.
Two days later, the Stanford Daily published photographs of the
incident indicating that the photographer had witnessed the violence
189
against police.
On the theory that the photographer might have captured an
assault on film, the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office

183. See Marcus, 367 U.S. at 723 (“Approximately 11,000 copies of 280 publications,
principally magazines but also some books and photographs, were seized . . . .”).
184. See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504 (1973) (“[T]he taking brought to an abrupt
halt an orderly and presumptively legitimate distribution or exhibition.”).
185. See Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 492 (1973) (“There is no showing . . . that the
seizure of the copy prevented continuing exhibition of the film.”).
186. See id. at 492 (“If . . . following the seizure, a prompt judicial determination of the
obscenity issue in an adversary proceeding is available . . . , the seizure is constitutionally
permissible.” (footnote omitted)).
187. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 550 (1978).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 551.
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secured and executed a search warrant for the Daily’s offices.
Invoking the First Amendment status of the materials sought, the
Daily pursued and obtained declaratory relief in federal district
191
192
court. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court reversed. After reciting the protections
conferred by obscenity cases like Marcus, A Quantity of Copies of
193
Books, and Roaden,
the Court held that the Daily’s First
Amendment interests added nothing to its case: “Properly
administered, the preconditions for a warrant . . . should afford
sufficient protection against the harms that are assertedly threatened
194
by warrants for searching newspaper offices.”
Zurcher, then, seems a departure from—indeed, a reversal of—
the Court’s approach in the obscenity cases. In defining the contours
of protection, Zurcher looked not to the substantive values of the
First Amendment, but to the procedural strictures of the Fourth. But
Zurcher’s core holding—that “the preconditions for a
195
warrant . . . should afford sufficient protection” —is not merely a
prescription for lower courts; it is a description of a set of facts that
presented no danger of prior restraint or speech-chilling effect.
Zurcher, in other words, is not a case unconcerned with the First
Amendment or a fundamental break with Marcus’s line. It is merely a
case grounded in circumstances that posed little threat to expression.
Part II.B.2 argues that Zurcher is best read to reaffirm the concerns
the moved the Court in Marcus and its progeny—and assuredly does
not provide the government blanket authority to seize expressive
materials, like Jennifer Gondola’s cell phone, so long as it observes
the usual Fourth Amendment niceties.
1. Zurcher’s Prescriptive Dimension. Zurcher’s core holding—
that “the preconditions for a warrant . . . should afford sufficient
protection against the harms that are assertedly threatened by
196
warrants for searching newspaper offices” —is prescriptive. It
broadly directs lower courts to measure the constitutionality of
searches and seizures by reference to the Fourth Amendment, not the
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
Id. at 552.
Id. at 553.
Id. at 564–65.
Id. at 565.
Id.
Id.
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First. That prescription seems to cast a wide net, and Zurcher stands
basically for the proposition that First Amendment rights “are not
deserving of more criminal procedure protections than other
197
activities.”
198
Berglund v. City of Maplewood
typifies the dismissive
treatment of First Amendment interests that Zurcher is read to
justify. The plaintiff in Berglund used a video camera to film an
199
arrest—his own—and police seized the camera from his friend. The
200
court first paid “lip service” to the notion that the “‘requirements of
the Fourth Amendment must be applied with scrupulous exactitude’
201
when materials seized are protected by the First Amendment.” It
next reasoned that the presence of exigent circumstances obviated the
202
need for a warrant. It then held, with no discussion of the particular
First Amendment interests at issue, that Zurcher and the Constitution
203
had been satisfied. Berglund’s relegation of the First Amendment to
the constitutional backseat is a rather straightforward application of
204
Zurcher’s bare prescription.

197. Solove, supra note 115, at 130. Zurcher’s language of course refers to newspaper offices
and warrants, but the case is generally taken to sweep more broadly. See, e.g., Tattered Cover,
Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044, 1055 (Colo. 2002) (en banc) (“The Supreme Court’s
pronouncements in Zurcher can be read to mean that, beyond the ‘scrupulous exactitude’
requirement, the First Amendment places no special limitation on the ability of the government
to seize expressive materials under the Fourth Amendment.”); infra notes 198–204 and
accompanying text.
198. For further discussion on Berglund, see supra notes 23–32 and accompanying text.
199. Berglund v. City of Maplewood, 173 F. Supp. 2d 935, 941 (D. Minn. 2001).
200. Schnapper, supra note 114, at 871.
201. Berglund, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 943 (quoting Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 564).
202. Id. at 944 (“[Officers] believed that the tape could be destroyed, erased or tampered
with if they did not take it from [the plaintiff’s companion].”). Noting that Zurcher was
concerned only with warrants, the Berglund court cited Roaden for the proposition that the
combination of probable cause and exigent circumstances is the equivalent of a warrant. Id.
203. Id.
204. Congress’s response to Zurcher, the Privacy Protection Act, prohibits some seizures of
certain materials from a person who has “a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper,
book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication.” Privacy Protection Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000aa(a) (2006). But the Act contains an exception that is animated when it is
reasonable to believe that issuing a subpoena for sought materials would result in their
“destruction, alteration, or concealment.” Id. § 2000aa(b)(3). The Berglund court treated this
exception as coextensive with the exigent-circumstances exception to constitutional protection:
“[F]or the same reasons . . . defendants did not need to obtain a search warrant under the
exigent circumstances exception, the court concludes that defendants[’] actions satisfy the
‘destruction of evidence’ exception to the Act.” Berglund, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 950. Gondola’s
facts would presumably shake out similarly.
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2. Zurcher’s Descriptive Dimension. But consider Zurcher again:
“[T]he preconditions for a warrant . . . should afford sufficient
protection against the harms that are assertedly threatened by
205
warrants for searching newspaper offices.” That holding is not just
an instruction to lower courts. It is also a description of the expected
interplay of the Fourth and First Amendments grounded in Zurcher’s
206
facts: the seizure by warrant of materials from the formal press.
Moreover, it is a description the Court offered only after lengthy
consideration of two familiar concerns—the risk of prior restraint and
chilling effects upon speech. In other words, though Zurcher’s First
Amendment problem was somewhat different than those at issue in
207
the obscenity cases, the Zurcher Court justified its holding by
reference to the same First Amendment interests that drove Marcus
and its progeny.
a. The Absence of Prior Restraint in Zurcher. The Daily argued
that a subpoena, not a search warrant, was the proper vehicle to
secure press photographs because a subpoena would “afford[]
opportunity to litigate the State’s entitlement to the material it seeks
208
before it is . . . seized.” This argument hearkened to Marcus’s
209
preseizure adversary proceedings, and the Court drew the analogy:
“The Court has held that . . . seizures . . . entirely removing arguably
protected materials from circulation may be effected only after an
210
adversary hearing and a judicial finding of obscenity.”
In rejecting the Daily’s argument, the Court did not broadly hold
that outside the obscenity context, the state has blanket authority to
seize First Amendment material if it properly observes Fourth
Amendment procedure. Neither did it overturn the decisions
205. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added).
206. See id. at 551 (“The warrant issued on a finding of ‘just, probable and reasonable cause
for believing that . . . evidence material and relevant to the identity of the perpetrators of
felonies . . . will be located [on the premises of the Daily.]’” (third alteration in original)).
207. When the state seizes alleged obscenity, the fear is that the vague nature of the
obscenity standard will result in the seizure of protected speech. See Marcus v. Search Warrant,
367 U.S. 717, 732–33 (1961) (“[O]nly one-third of the publications seized were finally
condemned . . . .”). In contrast, the warrant in Zurcher doubtless targeted protected speech; the
question was whether that should enter the Fourth Amendment calculus.
208. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 566.
209. See Marcus, 367 U.S. at 737–38 (“[T]he restraint on the circulation of publications was
far more thoroughgoing and drastic than any restraint upheld by this Court. . . . Mass seizure in
the fashion of this case was thus effected without any safeguards to protect legitimate
expression.”).
210. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 566–67.
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imposing enhanced procedural strictures on some obscenity
211
seizures. It wrote much more narrowly, noting only that the instant
facts presented no risk of prior restraint that would justify heightened
procedural requirements: “[S]urely a warrant . . . such as the one
issued here for news photographs . . . carries no realistic threat of
212
prior restraint or of any direct restraint whatsoever . . . .” That is not
reasoning that purports to govern the relationship between seizures
and speech interests forever and in all circumstances. It is reasoning
that found no impermissible restraint, and no constitutional harm, on
Zurcher’s narrow facts.
b. The Absence of Chilling Effects in Zurcher. The Daily’s chief
argument was that the use of search warrants against newspaper
offices would exert a “profoundly chilling effect . . . on the ability of a
213
journalistic organization to carry out its functions.” If such warrants
could issue, the Daily argued, confidential sources would dry up for
fear of investigation, and newspapers would decline to publish reports
214
that might lead to invasive office searches.
The Court brushed off that argument, too—but not on the
ground that the Daily’s parade of horribles was tolerable. The
reasoning, rather, was that it would not occur at all:
Nor are we convinced, any more than we were in Branzburg v.
Hayes, that . . . the press will suppress news because of fears of
warranted searches. . . . [F]ew instances in the entire United States
since 1971 involv[e] the issuance of warrants for searching
newspaper premises. This reality hardly suggests abuse; and if abuse

211. As made clear in P.J. Video, when, eight years after Zurcher, the Court recited the
“special protections” afforded some obscenity seizures before declining to extend those
protections to the evidentiary seizure before it. See New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868,
874–75 (1986) (“If such a seizure is pursuant to a warrant, issued after a determination of
probable cause by a neutral magistrate, and, following the seizure, a prompt judicial
determination of the obscenity issue in an adversary proceeding is available at the request of
any interested party, the seizure is constitutionally permissible.” (quoting Heller v. New York,
413 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1972))).
212. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 567. The warrant did not issue until after the news article on the
hospital occupation—the article to which the photographs were related—had been published.
Id. at 551.
213. Brief for Respondent, Zurcher, 436 U.S. 547 (No. 76-1484), 1977 WL 189744, at *3.
214. Id. at *19–21, *23–24.
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occurs, there will be time enough to deal with it. Furthermore, the
215
press . . . is not easily intimidated—nor should it be.

Just as Zurcher conferred no express constitutional blessing on
seizures that function as prior restraints, it did not say that evidentiary
seizures of First Amendment material should always be permissible
without regard for their tendency to chill protected speech. Indeed,
the Court declared there would be “time enough to deal with” that
216
brand of abusive seizure. Zurcher simply was not the case that
compelled the Court to do so.
Zurcher seemed to flip the obscenity calculus by defining speech
protection by reference to Fourth Amendment procedure, not First
Amendment substance, but the case rested on the same concerns as
Marcus and its speech-protective progeny. Zurcher’s prescription
depended on the Court’s factbound determination that warrants like
the one before it carried no risk of prior restraint and no danger of
chilling speech. When a seizure presents the threat of either or both,
courts should ask whether Zurcher’s descriptive dimension—that the
Fourth Amendment’s requirements extend “sufficient protection” to
217
First Amendment interests —still holds true.
III. “SUFFICIENT PROTECTION?” THE GONDOLA SEIZURE
In Zurcher, the Court asserted that the Fourth Amendment’s
requirements afford “sufficient protection” to First Amendment
218
interests when expressive materials are seized. Part III argues that,
although that assessment accurately described Zurcher’s facts, it does
not hold true for a “typical” citizen-recorder seizure like Gondola’s in
New Haven.
215. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 566 (citation omitted) (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972)). In Branzburg, the Court held that no “journalist’s privilege” exempted reporters from
revealing, before a grand jury, information gleaned from confidential sources. Branzburg, 408
U.S. at 692. It is worth noting that in so holding, the Court pointed out that subpoenas to testify
involve “no prior restraint,” id. at 681, and that the claimed “inhibiting effect” on speech caused
by such subpoenas was “to a great extent speculative,” id. at 694.
216. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 566. Perhaps disagreeing with the Court’s empirics, perhaps
quarreling more with Zurcher’s application than with Zurcher itself, Professor Akhil Amar
criticizes the case as failing to take true account of expressive interests: “The facts in Zurcher
cried out for comparison with Wilkes . . . yet the greatest search and seizure case in AngloAmerican history went unmentioned and unanalyzed.” Amar, supra note 53, at 805. This Note
takes no position on whether Zurcher had the empirics right, and, like Professor Amar, argues
its rule should not stretch too broadly.
217. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 565.
218. Id.
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To review the archetype: A citizen observes an arrest in progress
and exercises her First Amendment rights by using a cell phone to
record it. The suspect resists; an officer uses force to subdue him. The
exigent-circumstances doctrine entitles the arresting officer to seize
the phone as evidence of a crime—resisting arrest or a similar
offense—after determining that without the seizure, the evidence will
be lost. Because that test does not inquire into the officer’s subjective
state of mind, the Constitution permits the seizure whether the officer
legitimately wishes to preserve evidence, or wants only to suppress a
record of his own wrongdoing.
By reference to the Court’s twin concerns in cases involving the
seizure of protected expression—prior restraints and chilling effects—
this Part argues that the Fourth Amendment fails to extend
219
“sufficient protection” to the First Amendment interests of citizens
like Jennifer Gondola.
A. Cell Phone Seizures and Prior Restraint
In the Marcus line of cases, the Court imposed heightened
procedural requirements for all obscenity seizures that operated as
220
prior restraints; in Zurcher, the Court reaffirmed its commitment to
221
Marcus’s principles. As discussed, the recording act is protected
speech because it is incident to the ultimate speech act of
222
dissemination. A crime-scene seizure, then, imposes a governmental
223
barrier prior to the final act of speech. The threat of prior restraint
therefore permeates Fourth Amendment doctrine as applied to the
Gondola seizure. Indeed, for four reasons, this particular restraint is
especially problematic.
219. Id.
220. See, e.g., Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504 (1973) (“Seizing a film then being
exhibited to the general public presents essentially the same restraint on expression as the
seizure of all the books in a bookstore.”).
221. See supra Part II.B.
222. See supra Part I.C–D.
223. The seizure of Gondola’s camera disrupted the “presumptively legitimate distribution
or exhibition” of her video just as surely as did the seizure in Roaden, see Roaden, 413 U.S. at
504; Gondola’s footage did not reach the public until ten days after it was created, see supra
note 11 and accompanying text. The seizure did not, of course, represent a final restraint on
dissemination, but neither did any of the seizures in the Marcus line of cases. See, e.g., A
Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 212–13 (1964) (“Nor is the order . . . saved
because, after all 1,715 copies were seized and removed from circulation, P-K News Service was
afforded a full hearing on . . . obscenity . . . . [I]f seizure of books precedes an adversary
determination of their obscenity, there is danger of abridgement of the right of the public in a
free society to unobstructed circulation of nonobscene books.”).
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First, the restrained publication concerns truthful speech about
the administration of government—speech at the First Amendment’s
224
core. Nonobscene sexually explicit speech is not constitutionally
225
but “[f]reedom of expression has particular
“peripheral,”
significance with respect to government because . . . here . . . the state
226
has a special incentive to repress opposition . . . .” If any speech
must be handled with kid gloves, it is core political speech like
Gondola’s.
Second, the restraint is imposed by an individual deeply
227
interested in suppressing the speech.
The circumstances
surrounding the Gondola seizure underscore this point dramatically.
Sergeant Chris Rubino, the officer who first demanded Gondola’s
phone, was the very officer captured in the video with his foot on the
handcuffed suspect’s head. That conduct, deemed excessive force by
an internal investigation, later earned Rubino a fifteen-day
228
suspension. Rubino’s incentive to block dissemination of the video
can hardly be doubted, but the Fourth Amendment provided him
authority to do it.
In other words, present doctrine allows the government to
restrain the dissemination of speech critical of the government
229
because it is critical of the government; moreover, it permits
imposition of the restraint by the government actor who is being
criticized. As far as speech is concerned, it is as if incumbent political
candidates had the power to temporarily bar from the airwaves those
advertisements critical of their campaigns. That hardly represents
230
“sufficient protection” of expressive interests, and it comports

224. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“[A] major purpose of [the First]
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”).
225. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731 (1961) (“[T]he line between speech
unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated, suppressed or
punished is finely drawn.” (alteration in original) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
525)).
226. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.11 (1978) (quoting THOMAS
EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 9 (1966)) (quotation
marks omitted).
227. See Crawford & Hudson, supra note 39.
228. New Haven Sergeant Suspended for Excessive Force, NBC CONN. (Aug. 17, 2012, 2:28
PM),
http://www.nbcconnecticut.com/news/local/New-Haven-Sergeant-Suspended-for-Excess
ive-Force--166563406.html.
229. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
230. Cf. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978).
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poorly with a jurisprudence that has refused to countenance even
231
temporary restraints imposed by a disinterested magistrate.
Third, such a seizure restrains the dissemination of a unique item
of media, and for a time keeps that item from the market entirely.
One reason the Court disfavors prior restraints is that, unlike ex post
penalties, they prevent speech from reaching the public in the first
instance. That concern runs through the obscenity-seizure cases. As
the Court wrote of the seizure in Marcus, “The public’s opportunity
to obtain the publications was thus determined by the distributor’s
232
readiness and ability to . . . obtain[] and sell[] other copies . . . .”
A seizure like the one in New Haven works a more significant
deprivation. In A Quantity of Copies of Books, the state did not seize
233
every extant copy of Backstage Sinner or The Wife-Swappers. The
people of Kansas—or at least some people, somewhere—were
presumably able to procure the titles from distributors other than P-K
234
News Service. Not so in New Haven. When Rubino seized
Gondola’s phone, only one copy of her video existed, because
Gondola had just filmed the arrest and had not duplicated the file.
For the ten days it was retained by the police, the video, unlike
Backstage Sinner or The Wife-Swappers, was blocked entirely from
public consideration.
Fourth, the speech restrained in New Haven was time sensitive
235
because it was news. One might plausibly criticize a case like A
231. See A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 208–10 (1964) (invalidating
a search warrant issued by a district judge who “scrutinized” the seized books in advance).
232. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 736 (1961).
233. See A Quantity of Copies of Books, 378 U.S. at 211 (explaining that the distributor’s
ability to circulate the titles depended on whether it undertook to procure other copies); see also
id.. at 215 n.1 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting the books’ titles). Likewise, in Roaden, Pulaski
County seized one copy of Cindy and Donna—every copy owned by the theatre, but by no
means every copy in the world. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 497, 504 (1973).
234. See A Quantity of Copies of Books, 378 U.S. at 211 (“Their ability to circulate their
publications was left to the chance of securing other copies . . . .” (quoting Marcus, 367 U.S. at
736)).
235. The Court’s reluctance to countenance prior restraints on the publication of news is
dramatically chronicled in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per
curiam). In New York Times, the government sought to enjoin the Times and the Washington
Post from publishing the “contents of a classified study” on American involvement in Vietnam.
Id. at 714. The government asserted that publication would compromise efforts to end the
conflict and secure the return of prisoners of war. Floyd Abrams, The Pentagon Papers After
Four Decades, 1 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 7, 12 (2011). Refusing to grant the injunction,
Justice Stewart charged the government with an enormously high burden in his controlling
concurrence: “I cannot say that disclosure . . . will surely result in direct, immediate, and
irreparable damage to our Nation . . . . [T]here can under the First Amendment be but one
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Quantity of Copies of Books for its somewhat formalistic approach to
prior restraints: the challenged Kansas statute provided for a prompt
236
postseizure hearing on obscenity, and perhaps the short delay in the
public’s access to the seized books made, on the whole, little matter.
Even if that reasoning withstands scrutiny with respect to salacious
literature, it does not with respect to a video like Gondola’s. The New
Haven footage depicted a recent event—an arrest that would have
been reported as news, filmed or not. The natural and most effective
time to disseminate video of an occurrence is in its immediate
237
aftermath, not ten days later, and, though footage of a violent arrest
might be newsworthy in its own right whenever published, it
238
doubtless loses punch as the arrest recedes into the past.
B. Cell Phone Seizures and Chilling Effects
Zurcher rested in part on empirical rejection of the chillingeffects reasoning underlying decisions like Marcus. And so in
determining whether Zurcher’s broad edict ought to govern the
seizure of Gondola’s phone, it is appropriate to ask: If police are
permitted to seize cell phones in situations like the one in New
Haven, is it likely that citizens will decline to record police activity?
For four reasons, the answer is almost certainly yes.
First, in some circumstances, the evidentiary seizure of a cell
phone could give rise to the owner’s criminal liability. A phone
capable of recording police can obviously record other activities, too,
generally in the form of pictures as well as videos. To retrieve the
sought evidence, an officer would have to maneuver through other
videos and photos stored in the phone’s memory. Any incriminating

judicial resolution . . . .” New York Times, 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis
added). The Fourth Amendment was conceived in part as a means to secure the freedoms of
speech and press. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. It is ironic that the government has
more power to restrain speech, not less, in First Amendment cases that also implicate the
Fourth Amendment.
236. A Quantity of Copies of Books, 378 U.S. at 213.
237. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
238. In New Haven, Gondola’s video was released on June 12, 2012—ten days after it was
created—and still precipitated significant public reaction. See supra note 11 and accompanying
text. But the video itself had become a news item several days earlier on June 4, when it was
reported that Gondola had been arrested and her phone seized. See Bass, supra note 1. It is
impossible to say whether the footage would have sparked any outcry or discipline against
Rubino, see supra note 228 and accompanying text, had it been quietly released ten days after
an arrest occupying no special place in the public memory.
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material encountered in the process would become, under the plain
239
view doctrine, evidence usable against the phone’s owner.
Such governmental windfall has convicted more than one hapless
240
cell phone user. In United States v. Yockey, for instance, the
241
defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license. When
the arresting officer tried to turn off the man’s cell phone in
compliance with police procedure, he accidentally accessed a photo of
a naked teenager. The defendant was convicted on that basis of
242
243
possessing child pornography. Similarly, in State v. Carroll, an
officer retrieved a cell phone dropped by a fleeing suspect and
noticed that the phone’s display screen was an image of the suspect
244
smoking marijuana. That observation helped procure a search
245
warrant for the defendant’s phone, and the search uncovered more
246
incriminating evidence.
Whatever their salutary effect on law-enforcement interests, such
occurrences hardly encourage the valuable practice of monitoring
police. One expects that the indiscreet of society, knowing the
contents of their own photographic libraries, would disincline toward
filming an arrest—to the First Amendment’s loss.
Second, a police officer retrieving one evidentiary video from a
collection of other files might encounter files that are not
247
incriminating, but are intensely private. In Newhard v. Borders, for
example, an officer conducting an inventory search of an arrestee’s
cell phone happened upon nude photos of the man and his girlfriend
248
in “sexually compromising positions.” Amused, he shared the
249
images with other officers. A 2010 study found that twenty-five
percent of Facebook profiles belonging to college students contain
239. See, e.g., United States v. Yockey, 654 F. Supp. 2d 945, 957 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (“Police
may seize, without a warrant, an item that is 1) in plain view 2) when it is observed from a lawful
vantage point, 3) where the incriminating character of the item is immediately apparent.”
(quoting United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Horton v. California,
496 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1990)))).
240. United States v. Yockey, 654 F. Supp. 2d 945 (N.D. Iowa 2009).
241. Id. at 949.
242. Id. at 948–50.
243. State v. Carroll, 778 N.W. 2d 1 (Wis. 2010).
244. Id. at 5.
245. Id. at 5–6, 30−31.
246. Id. at 6−7, 32.
247. Newhard v. Borders, 649 F. Supp. 2d 440 (W.D. Va. 2009).
248. Id. at 444.
249. Id. The court held that the arrestee had no constitutional remedy. Id. at 443.
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250

“seminude or sexually provocative photos” —and such photos are
often captured first on a camera phone. Even more discreet forms of
communication—say, expressions of endearment from a significant
other—are likely not the sort of thing most people prefer to air
publicly. In short, it seems reasonable for even the law abiding to
desire that cell phone content remain private, and probable few
would jeopardize that privacy interest for the sake of watching the
watchmen.
251
Third, the loss of a cell phone for ten days is enormously
inconvenient. In a typical day, an average American cell phone user
makes or receives more than thirteen calls on the device; that same
252
person sends or receives forty-one text messages. More than half of
people who own cell phones—and 77 percent of users between the
ages eighteen and twenty-nine—regularly use their phones to access
253
254
the Internet. Similar numbers use their phones to send email. It is
unsurprising that nine out of ten cell phone users feel safer and more
255
connected to family and friends because of their phones, and that
nearly three out of ten “can’t imagine living without” their cell
256
phones. It would be a conscientious citizen indeed who offered up
ten days of communication and information seeking for the sake of
some abstract constitutional value.
Fourth, for citizen-recorders, there is little that counterbalances
the disincentives to film. “[T]he press,” wrote the Court in Zurcher,
257
“is not easily intimidated.” And it is true that the formal press has
good reasons not to forgo publication for fear of a later search; a
250. Joy Peluchette & Katherine Karl, Examining Students’ Intended Image on Facebook:
“What Were They Thinking?!”, 85 J. ED. FOR BUS. 30, 30 (2010).
251. See Bass & MacMillan supra note 11 (reporting that Gondola’s cell phone was returned
after ten days).
252. AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICANS AND TEXT MESSAGING 3, 6 (2011),
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2011/Americans%20and%20
Text%20Messaging.pdf.
253. MAEVE DUGGAN & LEE RAINIE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., CELL PHONE ACTIVITIES
2012, at 6 (2012), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2012/
PIP_CellActivities_11.25.pdf.
254. Id. at 7.
255. AMANDA LENHART, PEW RESEARCH CTR., CELL PHONES AND AMERICAN ADULTS 2
(2010), available
at
http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2010/PIP_Adults_Cell
phones_Report_2010.pdf.
256. PEW RESEARCH CTR., PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT: SPRING
TRACKING SURVEY 22 (2012), available at http://pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Data%
20Sets/2012/April_2012_Mobile_Topline.doc.
257. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978).
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compelling one is that news stories sell papers. No comparable
incentive moves the citizen-recorder. The benefits of police
258
monitoring distribute throughout society, but the costs fall only
upon the person whose cell phone is seized as evidence. This calculus
suggests a reverse tragedy of the commons—one in which almost no
citizens use the public square to record police activity.
In sum, Zurcher’s prescription for resolving the tension between
the First and Fourth Amendments rested on empirical claims about
the Fourth Amendment’s capacity to guard against the dangers of
prior restraints and chilling effects on speech. Those claims accurately
described Zurcher’s facts, but they do not hold true with respect to
seizures like the one in New Haven. Such seizures allow for the
imposition of prior restraints that threaten speech to a more
significant extent than the procedures struck down in cases like
Marcus. Moreover, the facts surrounding cell phone seizures suggest a
strong possibility of speech deterrence. Recognizing these two
259
dangers and hearkening to the principle of Roaden, courts should
view cell phone seizures, like obscenity seizures, as good candidates
for heightened protection.
IV. A NEW PRESCRIPTION
Like the seizures of alleged obscenity in the Marcus line of
cases—and unlike the facts in Zurcher—the exigent-circumstances
seizure of a cell phone used to record a violent arrest presents the
risks of prior-restraint and speech-chilling effects. Marcus and its
progeny guarded against those threats by imposing procedural
requirements beyond the normal dictates of the Fourth Amendment,
chiefly in the form of mandatory preseizure adversary proceedings on
260
the question of obscenity. That dictate, the Court reasoned, would

258. The chief benefit being greater adherence by police to norms of fairness and justice, as
a result of the increased accountability that filming occasions. See Claiborne, supra note 46, at
505–06 (“By recording the police, officers can be held accountable for their abuse of authority.
Allowing citizens to record the police would encourage law enforcement officials to be on their
best behavior.”).
259. “A seizure reasonable as to one type of material in one setting may be unreasonable in
a different setting or with respect to another kind of material.” Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S.
496, 501 (1973).
260. See, e.g., A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 210 (1964) (“It is our
view that since . . . [the plaintiff] was not afforded a hearing on the question of the obscenity
even of the seven novels before the warrant issued, the procedure was . . . constitutionally
deficient.”).

REARDON IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

11/13/2013 10:34 AM

CELL PHONES AND POLICE RECORDING

773

adequately protect First Amendment interests while accommodating
261
the state’s interest in regulating obscenity.
The trick in the context of cell phone seizures is to determine
whether any procedures can guard against First Amendment harms
while preserving the state’s interest in acquiring crime evidence. Few
would argue, for instance, that police should not have authority to
obtain a video that captures a shooting and the attendant arrest of the
suspect. Society has a weighty interest in catching murderers, and if
holding cell phone seizures unreasonable would prevent police from
doing that, perhaps the First Amendment harm is worth the candle.
A solution, then, must grant the police latitude to investigate
crime, but allow Gondola to keep her phone. This Part explores three
possible alternatives to physical seizure, concluding that the last—the
“seizure” of video files by electronic transmission, not physical
262
confiscation—can accommodate all interested parties. Given the
263
existence of at least one less-intrusive, speech-protective alternative,
courts should hold physical seizures unreasonable, trusting the

261. See id. (“State regulation of obscenity must ‘conform to procedures that will ensure
against the curtailment of constitutionally protected expression, which is often separated from
obscenity only by a dim and uncertain line.’” (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S.
58, 66 (1963))).
262. There is certainly authority for the proposition that the Constitution—or the Court—
can impose procedural requirements that seem more legislative than judicial. Marcus and its
progeny, for instance, held that the First Amendment demanded adversary proceedings in
advance of obscenity seizures, see supra Part II.A., and Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428
(2000), affirmed the constitutional provenance of Miranda warnings. Id. at 431–32. But here
there is no need. If police officers are simply disallowed to physically seize cell phones that
citizens use to film arrests, the political branches—generally responsive to the needs of law
enforcement—should have no trouble following the example of the District of Columbia, see
infra Part IV.C., and prescribing procedures that serve police within constitutional limits.
263. Granted, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is not generally marked by the weighing of
government alternatives in the same manner as, say, equal-protection case law. See, e.g., City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (“There is no evidence in this record
that the Richmond City Council has considered any alternatives to a race-based quota.”). But
inquiry into the existence of less-intrusive means is no stranger to the law of search and seizure,
particularly when, as here, the manner of search or seizure is at issue. In such cases, the Court
has often determined “reasonableness” by asking whether a certain level of intrusion was really
necessary. See, e.g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 935–36 (1995) (holding that a search of a
dwelling may be unreasonable if officers do not first “knock and announce” because
unannounced, forcible entry can damage property and cause undue intrusion—but that
unannounced entry is reasonable if necessary to preserve officer safety or evidence); Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989) (explaining that when determining whether an officer used
excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, “[t]he calculus of
reasonableness . . . [contemplates] the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
situation”).
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political branches to articulate and implement this new procedural
264
safeguard.
A. Judicial Intervention
The obscenity-seizure cases called for heightened judicial
265
scrutiny in the form of adversary action; the Zurcher Court avowed
its faith in the ability of magistrates to weigh First Amendment
266
interests in crafting warrants for news offices. Requiring judicial
involvement in cell phone seizures, rather than delegating blanket
authority to the officer in the field, would doubtless be a sound
starting point for increased protection of speech.
But such a requirement runs headlong into the state’s interest in
preserving crime evidence: the raison d’être of the exigentcircumstances exception is that some evidence tends to disappear. A
cell phone, itself mobile and concealable, possessed by an anonymous
recorder who captures a video, which could easily be deleted instead
of preserved and posted online, doubtless qualifies. In the “now or
267
never” circumstances animating the exception, mandatory judicial
intervention answers “never,” overbalancing toward speech
protection while ignoring the interests of law enforcement. It is no
solution.
B. The Proportionality Principle and Crime Severity
Zurcher fails to adequately protect First Amendment interests in
the context of cell phone seizures because the same Fourth
Amendment that justifies the legitimate evidentiary seizure of a
recording of a shooting, and the shooter’s apprehension, also justifies
the pretextual seizure of a video of a suspect who is resisting arrest.
Professor Christopher Slobogin has argued for the increased use of a
proportionality framework in Fourth Amendment doctrine. Under
the proportionality principle, “[a] search or seizure is reasonable if
the strength of its justification is roughly proportionate to the level of
268
intrusion.” In a similar vein, Professor Jeffrey Bellin has criticized

264. Or—because this particular measure is not constitutionally mandated, see supra note
262—implement any other procedure responsive to the concerns described in Part III.
265. See supra notes 260–61 and accompanying text.
266. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 567 (1978).
267. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 505 (1973).
268. Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the
Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1053, 1054 (1998). Assuming the strength of a
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the transsubstantive nature of Fourth Amendment doctrine, calling
for the consideration of crime-severity distinctions in determining
269
what searches and seizures are “reasonable.” It is tempting to posit
a crime-severity framework as a means to protect First Amendment
interests. Such a framework could permit the seizure of cell phone
video for some crimes (like murder) but not for others (like resisting
arrest).
But crime-severity analysis is ill-suited to the task. As an initial
matter, any effective doctrinal response to the problem of citizenrecording must alleviate the chilling effect of seizures upon speech. If
the authority of police to seize video depended on the categorization
of the recorded crime, only citizens familiar with the system of
categorization could safely predict whether they could record without
fear of seizure. Such uncertainty would merely encourage citizens to
270
“steer far wider of the forbidden zone than they otherwise would,”
and serve to chill the behavior that categorization was designed to
promote.
Moreover, to effectively guard against First Amendment harms,
a crime-severity framework would have to classify a crime like
resisting arrest as nonserious. That crime, after all, provides the
Fourth Amendment hook for the paradigmatic seizure in New
271
Haven. As a normative matter, the law should not characterize
behavior that endangers a police officer as insufficiently serious to
warrant robust investigation. As a practical matter, the line between
resisting arrest and assaulting a police officer—surely a crime of high
272
gravity—can be uncertain. Because classification of the crime at
seizure’s justification increases with the magnitude of the underlying crime, the proportionality
principle provides a theoretical basis for defining reasonableness by reference to crime severity.
269. Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment: Reassessing
Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2011). The “transsubstantive”
Fourth Amendment, he writes, “generally treats all crimes alike. . . . [T]he legal standard for
evaluating a search (or seizure) is the same whether a police officer suspects that a person
jaywalked or is the Green River Killer.” Id.
270. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 476 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
271. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
272. Under Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-167a, a person is guilty of the class A
misdemeanor of interfering with an officer when he “obstructs, resists, hinders or endangers any
peace officer” in the performance of the peace officer’s duties. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-167a
(2010). Under § 53a-167c, a person is guilty of the class C felony of assaulting an officer when,
“with intent to prevent a reasonably identifiable peace officer . . . from performing his or her
duties,” he “causes physical injury to such peace officer.” Id. § 53a-167c. For a suspect who
violently resists arrest—like the suspect detained by Sergeant Rubino—the only element
separating the misdemeanor from the felony is physical injury to the officer.
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issue would fall to the officer in the field, this approach would merely
re-vest that officer with sufficient discretion to suppress a recording
by seizure. It would thus scarcely avoid the danger of prior restraint
that plagues the present doctrine.
Finally, the facts of the New Haven seizure confound resolution
by reference to crime severity because Gondola’s video recorded two
wrongful acts: the suspect interfering with officers and Rubino
employing excessive force in the arrest. Defining footage as subject to
seizure strictly according to crime severity would create a doctrinal
oddity in which the more egregiously an officer behaved on camera,
the more likely police would be justified in effecting a seizure—a
somewhat perverse result. That is not to say that police may not
occasionally have a legitimate interest in preserving evidence of
potential official misconduct, but it surely indicates that a crimeseverity framework, standing alone, is not the answer to the New
Haven problem.
C. A Technological Problem, a Technological Solution
In the obscenity cases, the Court quieted First Amendment
threats by mandating preseizure adversary proceedings to parse
obscenity from protected speech. Zurcher presented a different issue
because the seized materials were concededly protected, but the
Court expressed faith that magistrates could tailor warrants to avoid
the imposition of prior restraints on publication and the sort of
unduly intrusive seizures that might chill press activity. Cell phone
seizures seem to present an intractable problem: the sought material
is First Amendment material, as in Zurcher, but here, Fourth
Amendment doctrine can only deliver that material to the state if it
countenances the risks of prior restraint and chilling effects.
Advances in technology created Gondola’s problem; fittingly,
they can solve it, too. If police “seize” cell phone video by obtaining
an electronic duplicate of the sought file, instead of physically seizing
the phone itself, First Amendment concerns dissipate without offense
to law-enforcement needs. Courts, recognizing the viability of this
273
speech-protective alternative, need do no more than hold physical
seizures unreasonable, leaving the procedural particulars to the
274
political branches.
273. See supra note 263.
274. As explained above, the Court in some cases invalidated seizures of obscenity because
the seizures violated the First Amendment, in other cases because the seizures were
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This proposed framework derives from a general order
promulgated by the District of Columbia Police Department in July
of 2012. The order “recognizes that members of the general public
have a First Amendment right to video record . . . [police
275
officers] . . . acting in an official capacity in any public space.” It
prescribes that so long as recording does not interfere with an
officer’s safety, officers may not order citizens to stop recording or
276
even obstruct filming. Finally, the order addresses recordings
reasonably thought to contain evidence of a crime:
If [an officer] has probable cause to believe that a . . . recording
device contains . . . evidence of criminal acts, the [officer] shall
request that the person . . . voluntarily transmit the images or sound
via text message or electronic mail to the [officer’s] official
277
government electronic mail account.

By constructively imposing this procedural requirement on
278
police departments, courts could at a stroke solve every First
Amendment problem raised by cell phone seizures. Following
electronic transmission, the citizen-recorder retains and is free to
disseminate a video recording, obviating the threat of prior restraint.
The citizen likewise retains the phone itself, and so is spared the
inconvenience that occurs when a phone is seized. Moreover, because
the phone user, not the officer, retrieves and sends the video, the
procedure implicates no privacy concerns. There seems little chance,
then, that seizures-by-transmission will chill protected speech.
What is more, the procedure protects law-enforcement interests
almost as well as would blanket authority to physically seize cell
phones: in a seizure like the one in New Haven, the law’s legitimate
interest in preserving evidence attaches entirely to the video, not to
unreasonable under the Fourth. See supra note 143. Convinced of the notion of “constitutional
reasonableness” underlying Roaden and espoused by Professor Amar, see Amar, supra note 53,
at 805, this Note adopts the latter position.
275. D.C. POLICE DEP’T, GENERAL ORDER NO. 304-19, VIDEO RECORDING,
PHOTOGRAPHING, AND AUDIO RECORDING OF METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT
MEMBERS BY THE PUBLIC 1 (2012), available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_304_19.pdf.
276. Id. at 2.
277. Id. at 3. If a person refuses either to give the recording device to police or to transmit
the file electronically, the officer must call his or her supervisor, explain the justification for the
seizure, and, if justified, retain the device for only as long as it takes to secure a warrant. Id. at
4–5.
278. That is, by simply holding a physical seizure is unreasonable, leaving the political
branches to implement the suggested procedure (or a similarly effective one). See supra note
262.
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279

the recording device. The one plausible drawback that comes to
mind is delay. In most cases, it would probably take longer to arrange
electronic transmission than to physically seize a phone.
That should rarely matter. Time is often of the essence when
police act, but an officer trying to obtain evidence of a crime has
shifted from crime response to crime investigation. It seems doubtful
that many officers would begin to actively gather evidence from
bystanders until the scene had been secured and safety restored, and
in the vast bulk of cases, those circumstances should allow time for
electronic transmission. In New Haven, for instance, officers had ably
subdued the suspect by the time Rubino demanded Gondola’s phone.
In the rare cases when police believe they must physically seize a
phone to preserve evidence, an exception may be appropriate. Such
seizures work First Amendment harms, so it is sensible to turn to
280
First Amendment doctrine and subject them to strict scrutiny,
permitting only those physical seizures necessary to serve a
281
compelling government interest. The government doubtless has a
282
compelling interest in preventing crime, but most physical seizures
would fail for tailoring: if the video would be needlessly cumulative
evidence, or the officer could have delayed seizure until the scene was
secure, or another officer could have effected a seizure-bytransmission, then the physical seizure would have been unnecessary.
283
The state’s low success rate in physical-seizure cases, and the rarity

279. Indeed, there is a good argument that this arrangement serves law enforcement better
than a blanket authority to seize. Insofar as the present regime deters citizens from recording, it
prevents evidence from coming into existence in the first place. The Court has adopted this
reasoning to justify the creation of evidentiary privileges: if a person knows that the words he or
she utters in a psychotherapy session can later be used as evidence, the words will never be
uttered. The government is similarly situated under the privilege regime and the no-privilege
regime—it has no usable evidence in either case—so the no-privilege regime should be rejected
as denying a benefit to the privileged party without conferring a complimentary advantage on
the government. See Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1996) (“Without a privilege, much of
the desirable evidence to which litigants such as petitioner seek access—for example, admissions
against interest by a party—is unlikely to come into being.”).
280. A species of balancing test that is, as described above, not entirely foreign to Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. See supra note 263.
281. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012) (describing strict scrutiny’s
interest and tailoring requirements).
282. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987).
283. These would nearly all be civil rights actions brought by citizen-recorders. The criminal
defendants captured on video would play little role in vindicating the rights of their filmers,
because only a party whose own Fourth Amendment rights have been violated may assert them.
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1978).
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with which officers will feel the need to resort to them, should result
in few physical seizures—and a citizenry free to guard the guards.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, citizens like Jennifer Gondola have exploited
new technology to capture footage of police misconduct and
disseminate it to a wide audience. By monitoring and criticizing the
administration of government, citizen recorders act in the First
Amendment’s greatest tradition. Their conduct is protected by its
guarantees. But Fourth Amendment doctrine, as enunciated in
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, permits in many cases on-the-ground
evidentiary seizure of cell phones used to record arrests. Such
seizures can function as particularly dangerous prior restraints on
speech, and they also chill important First Amendment behavior.
Zurcher held that Fourth Amendment procedure is generally
sufficient to protect First Amendment interests when expressive
materials are seized, but courts should be hesitant to apply that
holding to cases like Gondola’s. When Zurcher limited speech
protection to the Fourth Amendment’s strictures, it relied on two
critical conclusions: the facts before the Court carried neither a
danger of prior restraint nor the risk of chilling protected speech. Cell
phone seizures present both threats. With respect to Gondola’s case,
Zurcher’s thesis fails.
Courts should therefore look beyond Zurcher to cases like
Marcus v. Search Warrant, in which the Court found that the seizure
of alleged obscenity functioned as a prior restraint and would chill
protected speech. In Marcus and its progeny, the Court held that
those dangers rendered otherwise unobjectionable seizures
unreasonable, justifying the imposition of heightened procedural
requirements crafted to protect expressive interests.
Cell phone seizures deserve heightened protection in the
tradition of Marcus. The best solution is for courts to simply hold
such seizures unreasonable, permitting the political branches to
prescribe electronic transmission as the proper means of “seizure.”
Such a regime would serve law enforcement as well as the one in
place today, if not better. And it would guarantee to the people a
powerful new tool to vindicate an interest more ancient than the First
Amendment itself.

